This paper examines a shift in the dynamics of the term structure of interest rates in the U.S. during the mid-1980s. We document this shift using standard interest rate regressions and using dynamic, a¢ ne, no-arbitrage models estimated for the pre-and post-shift subsamples. The term structure shift largely appears to be the result of changes in the pricing of risk associated with a "level" factor. Using a macro-…nance model, we suggest a link between this shift in term structure behavior and changes in the dynamics and risk pricing of the Federal Reserve's in ‡ation target as perceived by investors.
Introduction
During the past few decades, the U.S. economy has undergone an important transformation that has likely altered the nature of uncertainty and risk in the economy as well as investors'attitudes and pricing of that risk. A key aspect of this transformation is the precipitous decline in overall macroeconomic volatility: Since the middle of the 1980s, the volatility of real GDP growth has been about 35 percent lower than earlier in the postwar period (as noted by Kim and Nelson 1999 and McConnell and Perez-Quiros 2000). Several factors may underlie this "Great Moderation" in economic ‡uctuations. 1 For example, better economic policy in the later sample may have helped stabilize the economy; indeed, many have argued that the conduct of U.S. monetary policy improved dramatically during the mid-1980s, helping to usher in the current period of diminished output volatility as well as remarkably low and stable in ‡ation. Alternatively, the recent quiescence in real activity and in ‡ation may largely re ‡ect good luck-that is, a temporary run of smaller economic shocks. Other potentially important factors include non-policy changes in the dynamics of the economy arising from, for example, improved inventory management or a greater share in aggregate output accounted for by the relatively stable service sector.
Finally, the development of deeper and more integrated …nancial markets and the introduction of new …nancial instruments may also have played a role both in damping the magnitude of economic ‡uctuations and in mitigating their e¤ects on investors. Given such dramatic shifts in the economic environment, a change in the behavior of the term structure of interest rates, and especially in the size and dynamics of risk premiums, would hardly be surprising. This paper examines how the dynamics of the term structure and of interest rate risk may have changed over time. We use a¢ ne, no-arbitrage, asset pricing models of the type popular in the …nance literature to investigate the recent shift in the behavior of the term structure; however, our investigation is also informed by the above literature on the recent transformation of the U.S. economy and by consideration of the macroeconomic underpinnings of the term structure factors in …nance models. 2 The payo¤ from this joint analysis is bidirectional as well. The macro-…nance perspective helps illuminate the nature of the shift in the behavior of the term structure, highlighting in particular the importance of a shift in investors' views 1 For references to the quickly growing literature on this topic, see Blanchard and Simon (2001) and Stock and Watson (2003) . 2 The connection between the macroeconomic and …nance views of the term structure has been a very fertile area for recent research, including, for example, Piazzesi (2005) , Diebold, Rudebusch, and Aruoba (2004), Hördahl, Tristani, and Vestin (2004), Rudebusch and Wu (2004) , Wu (2001) , Dewachter and Lyrio (2002) , Du¤ee (2004) , and Tinsley (2001, 2005) .
regarding the risk associated with the in ‡ation goals of the monetary authority. In addition, the shift in term structure behavior, as viewed using a no-arbitrage …nance model, sheds light on the nature of recent macroeconomic changes. Speci…cally, if one assumes that the factors underlying recent changes in the macroeconomy also have left their imprint on the yield curve, the …nance models suggest that more than just good luck was responsible for the recent macroeconomic transformation. Instead, a favorable change in economic dynamics, likely linked to a shift in the monetary policy environment, appears to have been an important element of the Great Moderation.
We begin our analysis in Section 2 with a simple empirical characterization of the recent shift in the term structure of U.S. interest rates. For this purpose, we use regressions of the change in a long-term interest rate on the lagged spread between long and short rates. Following Campbell and Shiller (1991), such regressions have been widely used to test the expectations hypothesis of the term structure, which assumes that the risk or term premiums embedded in long rates are constant. We …nd-as have many others-that these tests often reject the expectations hypothesis; however, of more interest for our purposes is the apparent signi…cant shift in the estimated coe¢ cients from these regressions. Indeed, since the mid-1980s, there is much less evidence against the expectations hypothesis than before, which suggests a shift in risk pricing and in the properties of risk premiums.
We use the results from these term structure regressions as broad summary statistics that characterize the changing empirical behavior of the term structure. Accordingly, the regression evidence is a useful …rst step to a more formal modeling perspective on the change in the term structure, which is provided in Section 3 using an estimated dynamic, a¢ ne, no-arbitrage model of bond pricing. The no-arbitrage model provides an obvious setting in which to examine changes in interest rate behavior and time-varying term premiums. Indeed, as demonstrated by Backus et al. (2001) , Du¤ee (2002) , and Dai and Singleton (2002) , a¢ ne, no-arbitrage models with a rich speci…cation of the dynamics of risk premiums are broadly consistent with the usual full-sample term structure regression results of the type obtained in Section 2. We conduct a similar consistency check between models and regression results, though from a somewhat di¤erent perspective. Namely, given our evidence of a signi…cant shift in the term structure regression results, we estimate a¢ ne, no-arbitrage models for each of the two subsamples that are associated with the di¤erent regression results. We …nd a statistically signi…cant di¤erence between the two estimated bond pricing models. In addition, the subsample models are able to account for much of the disparity between the subsample term structure regression results, thus supporting the empirical characterization of structural change in Section 2.
Beyond merely documenting the recent change in term structure behavior through regression analysis and model estimates, we also begin the more di¢ cult task of understanding and accounting for such time variation. In Sections 4 and 5, we illuminate the economic changes that may account for the shift in term structure behavior. We …rst use the estimated subsample no-arbitrage models to parse out whether a change in underlying factor dynamics or a change in risk pricing is more important in accounting for the shift in term structure behavior. In this regard, we …nd that changes in pricing the risk associated with a "level" factor are crucial for accounting for the shift in term structure behavior. We then provide an interpretation of this shift in terms of possible recent macroeconomic changes using the macro-…nance model of Rudebusch and Wu (2004) . Our results suggest a link between the recent shift in term structure behavior and changes in the risk and dynamics of the central bank's in ‡ation target as perceived by investors.
At this point, it is perhaps useful to provide some links to recent related research. There has been little analysis of the potential e¤ects on asset pricing induced by the important structural shifts in the economy documented in the macroeconomics literature. Indeed, the …nance literature often treats the entire postwar period as a long homogenous sample. An exception to this practice is the literature on regime-switching models of interest rates, including, for example, Hamilton (1988) , Ang and Bekaert (2002) , Bansal and Zhou (2002) , and Dai, Singleton, and Yang (2003) . These papers attempt to capture the postwar dynamics of interest rates with models that contain a succession of alternating regimes that are often linked informally to business cycles or interest rate policies. In contrast, we are interested in a single break in the behavior of the term structure, with our attention focused by the macroeconomic evidence that suggests the shift occurred during the middle to late 1980s. Also, following the macroeconomic evidence, we have no expectation that this change will be reversed (and we incorporate no pricing of further regime change risk). Of course, regime switching at a cyclical frequency could coexist with a single large shift in risk pricing as well, but our interest here is in the latter. Accordingly, our analysis is related to other work, including Watson (1999) , who examined a shift in the unconditional volatility of interest rates, and Lange, Sack, and Whitesell (2003), and Swanson (2005) , who considered a change in the forecastability of short-term interest rates. However, in contrast to these analyses, we examine a shift in behavior of risk pricing using both simple regression indicators as well as formal dynamic bond pricing models. Finally, many others, notably Fuhrer (1996) and Kozicki and Tinsley (2005) , have also linked the term structure regression estimates to the behavior of the perceived in ‡ation target using related methodologies.
Regression Evidence of a Term Structure Shift
In this section, to help guide our subsequent model-based analysis, we provide a simple empirical characterization of the recent shift in the behavior of the term structure. This characterization, which also provides a metric to assess the extent of any such shift, is based on a regression test of the expectations hypothesis that was popularized by Campbell and Shiller (1991) .
To derive this regression test, consider the following decomposition of the yield of a pure discount bond into average expected future yields and a term premium E t m;t :
where i m;t is the continuously compounded yield to maturity at time t of an m-month nominal zero-coupon bond with the notational simpli…cation for the one-month rate of i t i 1;t . In a modern setting, the term premium is a function of second-and higher-order conditional moments of the stochastic discount factor (or pricing kernel). If these moments do not vary over time, then term premiums will be constant, the expectations hypothesis will hold, and changes in long-term rates will result only from changes in expected future short-term rates. In this special case, we can obtain from equation (1) the pricing equation
where the left-hand side is the one-month holding period return of a bond of maturity m and the right-hand side is the one-month short rate plus a constant premium plus an expectational term. 3 This expectational term represents the capital gains or losses resulting from revisions to expected future short rates made between periods t and t + 1. With rational expectations, these revisions are unpredictable at time t, so they can be interpreted as a white noise error term. Equation (2) then leads naturally to the "long-rate regression" form of Campbell and Shiller (1991) :
where m and m are maturity-speci…c regression intercept and slope coe¢ cients, and " m;t is the white noise expectational term (scaled by 1 m). Under the expectations hypothesis, the estimated slope coe¢ cient m will equal unity; that is, the term spread will be an optimal forecast of future change in the long rate (adjusted for a constant risk premium), so when the spread between long and short rates widens (narrows), the long rate should rise (fall) in the following period.
Deviations from the expectation hypothesis will push the slope coe¢ cient away from one.
In particular, as noted early on by Mankiw and Miron (1986) , a time-varying term premium can drive the estimated m to zero or even to negative values as the resulting term spread re ‡ects variation in expected risk premiums rather than in future rates. In our analysis below, we construct models in which the time variation in the term premium (or equivalently the conditional heteroskedasticity of the discount factor) is su¢ cient to generate the regression coe¢ cients found in the data, which are often signi…cantly less than one. However, we are not primarily interested in the slope coe¢ cients as indicators of the expectations hypothesis; instead, we use them as simple summary statistics of term structure behavior, and we interpret shifts in these coe¢ cients as indications that the term structure behavior has changed. Of course, the fact that so many researchers have focused so much e¤ort on estimating these slope coe¢ cients makes them of particular interest, but other simple metrics of term structure change could also be considered (as in Watson 1999 and Lange, Sack, and Whitesell 2003). time to learn about and assess the importance of these changes, which makes the choice of a breakdate somewhat indeterminate. We will examine a variety of potential breakdates below;
however, for an initial look at the data with an a priori choice of a breakdate, the lower half of 4 These estimates may also di¤er because of variations in the methods used to create the zero-coupon yields data-particularly in interpolating missing maturities and smoothing out idiosyncratic observations (e.g., Bliss 1997). Our data are unsmoothed Fama-Bliss yields data, kindly supplied by Robert Bliss, but we obtained qualitatively similar breakpoint results with smoothed Fama-Bliss data (the type of data used in Dai and Singleton 2002) . A …nal di¤erence is in approximating im 1;t+1 by im;t+1. We have the entire maturity set of yields, so we do not employ this approximation, but the other authors in Table 1 do apply it. suggested by the change in Fed Chairmen and conveniently supplies two subsamples of nearly equal size.)
The long-rate regression results in the lower half of Table 1 show an interesting di¤erence across the two subsamples. The slope estimates from the nine long-rate regressions are all negative in subsample A, as in the full sample, while they are predominately positive in the later subsample B. Furthermore, the expectations hypothesis is rejected in every subsample A regression, while it is rejected in only one subsample B regression (at the 3-month horizon). Note that this lack of rejection does not re ‡ect in ‡ated standard errors from a short sample. In fact, for each maturity, the standard errors from the subsample B regressions are smaller than the full-sample ones.
Evidence from a formal break test is given in the bottom line in Table 1 , which shows the p-value at each maturity for a Chow-type F -test that the slope coe¢ cient has not shifted between subsamples A and B. 5 Taken one maturity at a time, the evidence of a shift in the slope coe¢ cient is decidedly mixed. For the three regressions using 6-, 9-, and 12-month long rates, the evidence suggests a clear break, while at other maturities, the p-values are typically in the 15 to 20 percent range. The Table 1 Still, the fact that all of the slope coe¢ cients, taken as a group, have shifted in the same direction in the later subsample is highly suggestive of a structural break in the behavior of the term structure. Rigorous statistical evidence on this point requires the formulation of a joint test. The next section will develop closely related evidence in the context of an empirical noarbitrage model of the entire term structure. However, in the spirit of the regression analysis of this section, we also examine evidence on the joint signi…cance of simultaneous changes in several of the slope coe¢ cients by stacking several long-rate regressions for di¤erent maturities into one system regression. Although none of these long-rate regressions share a common regressor or regressand, it is highly likely that their error terms are correlated, so the system Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) technique will generate more precise estimates. 6 Speci…cally, we stack 5 The speci…c test used adds two variables to the long-rate regression: a dummy variable that is non-zero only during subsample B and a spread times that dummy. The break test is an F-test of the signi…cance of the latter. 6 As the term structure literature has stressed (e.g., Litterman and Scheinkman 1991, Du¢ e and Kan 1996), almost all movements in the yield curve can be captured by a few factors; thus, the errors in individual long-rate regressions are likely correlated across the regressions. On the other hand, the term spreads used in the regressions the individual long-rate regressions for the 3-, 24-, and 60-month maturities, which are three representative maturities for which the stability null hypotheses of unchanged slope coe¢ cients were not rejected in the individual regressions. The system regression for these three maturities is 2 4 i 2;t+1 i 3;t i 23;t+1 i 24;t i 59;t+1 i 60;t 
The estimation results for this SUR regression are shown in Table 2 for the full sample and for subsamples A and B. The slope coe¢ cient estimates in subsamples A and B continue to
show the same stark quantitative di¤erences apparent in the individual regressions in Table 1; however, the coe¢ cient standard errors are, on average, about half as large in magnitude. This greater precision sharpens inference, and for these three maturities (which again were chosen for their individual non-rejection of stability null), the p-value of .007 clearly rejects the joint null hypothesis of no change in the three slope coe¢ cients between the A and B subsamples. These system break test results are representative of other combinations of three or more yields. 7 Finally, while we have considered a speci…c breakdate based on a prior view of the timing of changes in the behavior of aggregate output, in ‡ation, and monetary policy, it is also useful to consider testing more generally the null of parameter stability without such a prior. To do this,
we consider all possible breakdates in the middle 70 percent of the full sample for the system regression, and calculate a Chow-type test statistic at each of these breakdates. at di¤erent maturities are also likely correlated for the same reason. The e¢ ciency gains from running SUR will depend on which correlation dominates, and the Appendix provides some evidence on this issue.
In summary, we take the regression results as indicative of a break in term structure behavior in the 1980s. Determining the nature of that break in terms of changes in the dynamics of the short rate or the pricing of interest rate risk is the subject of the remainder of our analysis.
Estimating Subsample No-Arbitrage Models
In the preceding section, we provided regression evidence of a signi…cant shift in the behavior of the term structure during the 1980s. In this section, we estimate dynamic term structure models that can capture that shift in behavior. The framework we use is a standard representation from the empirical bond pricing literature that assumes no opportunities for …nancial arbitrage across bonds of di¤erent maturities. 9 We focus on a two-factor, Gaussian, a¢ ne, no-arbitrage term structure model, or an A 0 (2) model as de…ned in Dai and Singleton (2000) . The model features a constant volatility of term structure factors but the risk pricing is state-dependent, which implies conditionally heteroskedastic risk premiums. Dai and Singleton (2002) compare the performance of di¤erent dynamic term structure models and …nd that this type of speci…cation performs best in matching the full-sample long-rate regression coe¢ cients. 10 The model is formulated in discrete time. The state vector relevant for pricing bonds is assumed to be summarized by two latent term structure factors, L t and S t . These are stacked in the vector F t = (L t ; S t ) 0 , which follows a Gaussian VAR(1) process:
where " t is i.i.d. N (0; I 2 ), is diagonal, and is a 2 2 lower triangular matrix. The short (one-month) rate is de…ned to be a linear function of the latent factors:
Without loss of generality, this implicit de…nition of 1 implies unitary loadings on the two factors by the short rate because of the normalization of the unobservable factors. Finally, following Constantinides (1992), Singleton (2000, 2002) , Du¤ee (2002) , and others, the prices of risk associated with the conditional volatility in the L t factor, denoted L;t , and in the S t factor, denoted S;t , are de…ned to be linear functions of the factors:
Note that if all of the elements of 1 are zero, then the price of risk and the risk premium are constant, and, in this special case, the expectations hypothesis holds.
Under the no-arbitrage assumption, the logarithm of the price of a j-period nominal bond is a linear function of the factors
where the coe¢ cients A j and B j are recursively de…ned by
Given this bond-pricing formula, the continuously compounded yield to maturity i j;t of a jperiod nominal zero-coupon bond is given by the linear function
where A j = A j =j and B j = B j =j.
The above model is estimated by maximum likelihood using end-of-month data on U.S.
Treasury zero-coupon bond yields of maturities 1, 3, 12, 36, and 60 months (the yields are expressed at an annual rate in percent.) In estimating the model, the mean of the short rate 0 is set to the unconditional mean of the short rate in each subsample period (and 0 L is normalized to zero). Therefore, the estimated model parameters for factor dynamics, risk pricing, and factor shocks are
; and = Table 3 . The most important result in Table 3 is that the hypothesis of a single unchanged data-generating process during the full sample is rejected at any signi…cance level-the likelihood ratio test statistic (i.e., twice the full-sample log-likelihood minus twice the sum of the subsample log-likelihoods), which follows a 2 (12) under the null no-change hypothesis, is 481.88. This evidence provides another strong rejection of the joint stability hypothesis, consistent with the SUR test results of Table 2 , and it helps validate the splitting of the sample.
The two subsample models exhibit interesting similarities and di¤erences in parameter estimates. As is typically found, both the subsample A and subsample B models have a very persistent L t factor ( L :99) and a less persistent S t factor ( S :95). These two factors are often given the labels "level" and "slope," respectively, since a positive shock to L t pushes up yields at all maturities while a positive shock to S t predominantly pushes up yields at short maturities. Indeed, the factor loadings of both of our subsample estimated models are consistent with such a designation. Although both level and slope are a bit more persistent during the later subsample, a more striking di¤erence is found in the factor shock volatilities in the two subsample periods. In particular, the volatilities of both factor shocks are signi…cantly larger in Overall, the subsample model estimates appear consistent with the notion of a shift in term structure behavior as suggested by the regression evidence in Section 2, and in the next section, we will link the di¤erences in model parameter estimates to the di¤erent long-rate term structure regression results. As suggested in Section 2, it is the change in the volatility of risk premiums across the two subsamples that drives the shift in the regression results, and a direct examination of this change is also illuminating. Figure 3 plots the risk premiums for a representative 5-year yield for subsamples A and B from the associated subsample model estimates (the mean of the risk premiums in each subsample is removed). 12 In these models, the volatility of a risk premium re ‡ects time variation in the price of risk, which is a linear function of the factors. Thus, the larger 1 and the larger factor volatilities in the earlier subsample will generate more variation in the price of risk and risk premiums. This is evident in Figure 3 , as the standard deviations of the estimated risk premiums are 67 basis points in subsample A and 40 basis points in subsample B.
Accounting for the Shift in Term Structure Behavior
Section 2 provided evidence of a signi…cant break in the estimated coe¢ cients in various longrate term structure regressions, and Section 3 provided evidence of a signi…cant break in a no-arbitrage dynamic term structure model. In this section, we link these two results together by investigating the ability of the two subsample no-arbitrage models estimated in Section 3
to account for the long-rate regression results through changing factor and risk price dynamics.
In essence, we examine the change in the volatility of risk premiums through the lens of the long-rate term structure regressions.
Our examination focuses on long-rate regression coe¢ cients implied by a particular noarbitrage term structure representation. For a given no-arbitrage model of the form described in Section 3, the population value of the long-rate regression coe¢ cient for maturity m is given 
where the B m 's are the factor loadings de…ned in Section 3 and denotes the unconditional variance-covariance matrix of the two factors in F t . From equation (9), note that the B m 's are determined by , 1 , and -that is, by the covariance of the factor shocks, the sensitivity of the price of risk to the factors, and the parameters of the autoregressive dynamics of the factors, respectively. From equation (5), note that depends on the parameters and : Therefore, the population regression coe¢ cients associated with di¤erent no-arbitrage model structural estimates are straightforward to compute.
The implied long-rate regression coe¢ cients associated with the subsample model estimates shown in Table 3 Figure 6 show the results of mixing coe¢ cient estimates from subsample A and subsample B. It is interesting to note that the four highest lines all use B while the four lowest use the A , which suggests that risk pricing plays a key role in accounting for the term structure shift.
To provide a concise quantitative accounting of this shift, we focus on just the 120-month maturity and the e¤ect on the 120 coe¢ cient in Table 4 . However, our main results generalize to other long-rate maturities as well (as suggested by Figure 6 ). The top line in Table 4 shows the change in the population estimate of 120 resulting from a shift from all subsample A noarbitrage parameter estimates (denoted as the A , A , A model) to all subsample B parameter estimates (denoted as B , B , B ). This change, which is 2.88, is also the di¤erence between the right-hand-side endpoints of the thick solid lines in Figures 4, 5 , and 6. The rest of Table 4 provides a quantitative accounting of the source of this change. In contrast, as shown in the middle lines, the shift in the factor shock volatility parameters from
A to B induces, on average, a 0.46 increase in 120 , which is a modest step in the observed direction of change. Finally, as shown in the bottom panel of Table 4 , the change in the risk pricing parameters from A to B more than accounts for the total observed change in the population 120 .
The risk pricing parameters therefore appear crucial in generating the changing pro…le of the long-rate regression coe¢ cients across the two subsamples. The more factor-sensitive risk pricing in subsample A-since the subsample A estimates of 1 are larger than in subsample Bgenerates greater time variation in the risk premiums for a given level of factor volatilities. These more variable subsample A term premiums induce greater deviations from the expectations hypothesis and push the m estimates in the early subsample below those in subsample B. This e¤ect is reinforced to a limited extent by the higher variances of the factor shocks in the …rst subsample (since the elements of A are larger than those of B ). These higher factor shock variances induce higher factor volatilities and hence greater time variation in the price of risk and risk premiums. However, a partial o¤set to the above two factors comes from the higher autoregressive parameters in the later subsample. Speci…cally, because the elements of B are higher than those of A , these work to boost the volatility of the factors and risk premiums in subsample B and lower the regression coe¢ cients. 13 Table 5 reports on a model permutation procedure that considers individual parameters instead of blocks of parameters. There are eight key individual model parameters in , , and
LS , and 1 SS . Table 5 provides the average e¤ect on 120 of changing each one of these coe¢ cients from its subsample A estimate to its subsample B estimate, holding the other coe¢ cients …xed. 14 These results further narrow the source of the upward shift in the long-rate regression coe¢ cients in the later subsample to just a few model parameters, all of which are related to the level factor. In particular, the two most in ‡uential 1 3 We have also found that more persistent factors, even holding the volatility of the factors constant (as opposed to the holding constant the volatility of the factor shocks), leads to lower regression coe¢ cients. 1 4 For investigating the e¤ects of a change in any given parameter, there are 128 possible mixed sample A and B permutations for the other seven parameters. (Note that 1 SL is zero in both samples.) We do not investigate all of these permutations; instead, Table 5 provides the average change in 120 using a representative sample of eight of these con…gurations using the same blocks of parameters in Table 4. parameters are 1 LL and 1 LS , which control the way in which the price of risk that is attached to ‡uctuations in the level factor varies with the magnitude of level and slope. The reduced size of these risk pricing parameters in subsample B can account on their own for the shift in the long-rate regression coe¢ cients across the two subsamples. The reduction in L , the variance of shocks to level, also plays some role by reducing level factor volatility (and the associated risk premium variability), but this e¤ect is o¤set by the increase in the level factor autoregressive parameter LL , which tends to boost the level factor variability.
To summarize, the standard no-arbitrage bond pricing model suggests that the recent historical shift in term structure behavior predominantly re ‡ects a change in the way investors price risk associated with the level factor. Changes in factor dynamics and factor shock volatility appear to have played a relatively modest role. These term structure results may also help illuminate the nature of the moderation and transformation of the U.S. economy that occurred in the 1980s. As noted in the introduction, one hypothesis is that there was a run of less volatile economic shocks in the more recent period. Our estimates support the presence of less volatile factor shocks in the recent subsample; however, the e¤ect of this change on the behavior of the term structure appears modest. Instead, our estimates indicate that there was a important change in the dynamics of the economy that e¤ected risk pricing. The next section elaborates on this interpretation using a no-arbitrage macro-…nance model that links movements in the level factor to observable variables in the economy.
A Macro-Finance Perspective on the Term Structure Shift
The analysis so far suggests that an important transformation occurred in the U.S. economy in the 1980s regarding the behavior of the level factor and, in particular, the pricing of risk associated with that factor. A natural next step is to provide an economic interpretation of these changes. We pursue this task in the structural macro-…nance model of Rudebusch and Wu (2004) , which we describe brie ‡y before considering some model perturbations.
The Rudebusch-Wu macro-…nance model combines the above canonical no-arbitrage term structure representation with elements from a standard macroeconomic model. A key point of intersection between the …nance and macroeconomic speci…cations is the short-term interest rate. The short rate remains a linear function of two latent term structure factors as in the …nance model, so
As demonstrated in Rudebusch and Wu (2004) , however, there is a close connection among these level and slope factors and a simple Taylor (1993) rule for monetary policy:
where r is the equilibrium real rate, t is the central bank's in ‡ation target, t is the annual in ‡ation rate, and y t is a measure of the output gap. This link re ‡ects the fact that the Federal
Reserve sets the short rate in response to macroeconomic data in an attempt to achieve its goals of output and in ‡ation stabilization. 
The slope factor S t captures the Fed's dual mandate to stabilize the real economy and keep in ‡ation close to its medium-term target level. Speci…cally, S t is modeled as the Fed's cyclical response to deviations of in ‡ation from its target, t L t , and to deviations of output from its potential, y t :
In addition, a very general speci…cation of the dynamics of S t is adopted that allows for both policy inertia and serially correlated elements not included in the basic Taylor rule. 16 The dynamics of the macroeconomic determinants of the short rate are then speci…ed with equations for in ‡ation and output that are motivated by New Keynesian models (adjusted to apply to monthly data):
1 5 As shown in Rudebusch and Wu (2004) , Lt is primarily associated with yields of maturities from 2 to 5 years, which is an important indication of the relevant horizon for the associated in ‡ation expectations. 1 6 If u = 0, the dynamics of St arise from monetary policy partial adjustment; conversely, if S = 0, the dynamics re ‡ect the Fed's reaction to serially correlated information or events not captured by output and in ‡ation. Rudebusch (2002) shows that the latter is often confused with the former in empirical applications.
That is, in ‡ation responds to the public's expectation of the medium-term in ‡ation goal (L t ), two lags of in ‡ation, and the output gap. Output depends on expected output, lags of output, and a real interest rate.
The speci…cation of long-term yields in the macro-…nance model follows the standard noarbitrage formulation described in Section 3. Accordingly, the state space of the combined macro-…nance model can be expressed by equation (5) with the state vector F t rede…ned to include output and in ‡ation. The dynamic structure of this transition equation is determined by equations (14) through (16) . There are four structural shocks, " ;t , " y;t , " L;t , and " S;t , which are assumed to be independently and normally distributed. The short rate is determined by (12) .
For pricing longer-term bonds, the risk price associated with the structural shocks is assumed to be a linear function of only L t and S t , which matches the formulation in Section 3 and allows for easy comparison. 17 However, it should be noted that the macroeconomic shocks " ;t and " y;t are able to a¤ect the price of risk through their in ‡uence on t and y t and, therefore, on the latent factors, L t and S t .
The estimates of this macro-…nance model from Rudebusch and Wu (2004) , which are based on U.S. term structure data that are essentially from subsample B (1988 to 2000), are shown in Table 6 . As above, the factor L t is very persistent, with a L estimate of 0.989, which implies a small but signi…cant response to actual in ‡ation. The monetary policy interpretation of the slope factor is supported by the reasonable estimated in ‡ation and output response coe¢ cients, g and g y , which are 1.25 and 0.20, respectively. These values, as well as the estimated parameters describing the in ‡ation and output dynamics, appear to be in line with other estimates in the literature.
We next turn to the implied long-rate regression coe¢ cients from this model. 18 As before, we conduct a model simulation exercise in which repeated samples of data are generated from the macro-…nance model and used in the calculation of regression coe¢ cients. Figure 7 shows median values of the regression coe¢ cients obtained from the macro-…nance model simulated data as a solid line. The coe¢ cients are predominantly positive and decline from about 1 at a very short maturity to slightly negative at a 120-month maturity. These estimates are a bit 1 7 Therefore, 1 continues to have just four potentially non-zero entries ( The analysis in Sections 3 and 4 suggested that changes in the conditional volatility of the level factor and in the pricing of level factor risk were the most important factors in accounting for the shift in long-rate regression coe¢ cients. This same issue can be examined in the macro…nance model. In particular, as noted above, the key parameters
LS , and L play the same role in both models. The e¤ect of changing these parameters in the macro-…nance model is shown in Table 7 , which, as in Tables 4 and 5 , focuses on just the coe¢ cient 120 for conciseness.
The …rst three lines of Table 7 show the e¤ect on 120 of changing
LS , and L from their estimates in Table 6 (-0.0045, 0.0168, and 0.342, respectively) to their subsample A estimates in Table 3 (-0.0146, 0.0342, and 0.41, respectively). 19 Increasing (in absolute value) 1 LS and L gives clearly lower estimates of 120 , while changing 1 LL has little e¤ect on its own. However, the combination of all three changes-line 4-shifts 120 down by a substantial 2.05. That is, as above in the basic no-arbitrage model, the risk pricing and dynamics of the level factor appear crucial for accounting for the shift in term structure behavior.
More importantly, the macro-…nance model provides an economic interpretation of this shift.
Since the level factor re ‡ects the perceived in ‡ation target, the macro-…nance explanation of the shift in term structure behavior is that during the 1970s and early 1980s investors had a very di¤erent view of the medium-term outlook for in ‡ation than they did later on. Investors in the early period appear to have viewed the in ‡ation goal as particularly uncertain, in the sense that it had a greater conditional volatility (a higher L ) and that its price of risk was more sensitive to ‡uctuations in the economy (in particular, 1 LS is higher early on). This explanation is consistent with the view that expectations of the underlying goals for in ‡ation were less …rmly anchored in investors' minds during the earlier subsample, which is a common interpretation of the historical evolution of U.S. monetary policy. However, interpreting this shift in terms of changes in underlying risk preferences or technology is di¢ cult, because the linkage between an a¢ ne, no-arbitrage term structure model and an underlying general equilibrium model has not been clearly formulated in the literature. Gallmeyer, Holli…eld and Zin (2005) perhaps have made the most progress in this regard and show how the form of the monetary policy rule can enter the pricing kernel and directly a¤ect the risk pricing parameters. Thus, it seems plausible that a monetary policy regime shift-speci…cally, a lower L -might have induced changes in the risk pricing parameter estimates. Alternatively, improvements in …nancial markets or institutions may have allowed investors to hedge risk better in the later subsample, which may also account for a risk compensation behavior that was less sensitive to ‡uctuations in the economy.
Other changes in the economy may also have played a role in the shifting term structure behavior. Many authors have noted that the volatilities of shocks to output and in ‡ation are signi…cantly larger in the 1970s than in the 1990s. To consider the possibility that the higher conditional macroeconomic volatility in the earlier period helped account for the lower regression coe¢ cients, we increase the standard deviations of the output and in ‡ation shocks, and y , by 50 percent, which is the order of magnitude suggested by previous empirical work, including Stock and Watson (2003) and Moreno (2004) . As shown in the second line from the bottom in Table 7 , this model perturbation has little e¤ect on the estimate of 120 . Another important economic change that many estimated models of Federal Reserve behavior have highlighted is the substantially lower responsiveness of monetary policy to in ‡ation that occurred before the 1980s. 20 To consider the possibility that a lower in ‡ation response parameter in the earlier subsample may account for the lower regression coe¢ cients, we reduced the in ‡ation response coe¢ cient in the monetary policy rule, g , by one-half, which is broadly in line with various empirical estimates. The result, as shown in the bottom row of Table 7 , is only a very modest e¤ect on the estimate of 120 .
Conclusion
As noted in the introduction, the existence of a shift in the behavior of the term structure would not be surprising, given the dramatic changes in the economy over the past few decades. We indeed document such a shift in the behavior of the term structure using a simple regression technique as well as more structural models. Our key result is that the volatility of term premiums appears to have declined over time; furthermore, this decline appears to have been induced by changes in the conditional volatility and price of risk of the term structure level 2 0 See, for example, Fuhrer (1996), Judd and Rudebusch (1998), Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000), and Rudebusch (2005) for discussion. In contrast to the in ‡ation response coe¢ cient, the evidence on a signi…cant change in the monetary policy output response coe¢ cient is mixed.
factor, which we suggest may be related to investors'perceptions of the Fed's in ‡ation goals.
Of course, as many have noted, a shift in the conduct of monetary policy will likely lead to a change in the behavior of the term structure (for example, Rudebusch 1995 , Fuhrer 1996 , Kozicki and Tinsley 2001 and Cogley 2003 ). However, our results suggest that the linkage is perhaps more subtle than is commonly appreciated. For example, although the Fed's short rate response to changes in in ‡ation during the 1970s has been found to be less vigorous than in the 1990s, such a change-on its own-appears to have small direct e¤ects on the evolution of term premiums and appears unlikely to account for the shift apparent in our empirical results.
This conclusion appears to mirror that of Stock and Watson (2003) , who found small direct e¤ects of monetary policy rule changes on macroeconomic volatility. However, our results do suggest that broader, but likely closely related, shifts in the monetary policy environment may have played an important role. In particular, a change in the perceptions of the in ‡ation goals of the Fed could have altered the dynamic evolution of term premiums. Such a change may re ‡ect a greater willingness to anchor the in ‡ation rate or a greater transparency about such desires. 
Therefore, a higher correlation between the term spread and the expected holding period return or more volatile term premiums will drive m further away from one.
A.2. Small-sample inference using the long-rate regression
In Section 2, we conduct inference on the expectations hypothesis and the hypothesis of stable parameters using asymptotic distributions that have been called into question in certain circumstances (e.g., in Bekaert, Hodrick, and Marshall 1997) . In this section, we report monte carlo simulations using the data generated from estimated models of Section 3 in order to explore the appropriateness of this inference in small samples for our models. Table A1 displays the results of testing the expectations hypothesis based on 1000 simulated samples of size 396, 216, and 180 observations, respectively, for the full sample, subsample A, and subsample B. Using these simulated data, the change in the 3-month rate and the change in the 60-month rate are regressed on the on the 3-and 1-month spread and the 60-and 1-month spread, respectively. Each entry in the table reports the frequency with which an F-test statistic rejects the null expectations hypothesis, which is the hypothesis that the slope coe¢ cient (or a pair of slope coe¢ cients) is equal to one. These rejections are calculated using the standard 5 percent asymptotic critical values. In the top panel of Table A1 , model simulations are based on parameter estimates from each sample of data (given in Table 3 ) except that the price of risk is set to be a constant ( 1 is set equal to 0). Constant risk prices in this term structure model imply that risk premiums are constant; thus, the null expectations hypothesis is true and the population slope regression coe¢ cients are indeed equal to one. In this case, the reported rejection frequency is the empirical size of the F-test.
The …rst row of the top panel reports the frequency of rejection using as a data-generating process the full-sample model estimates in Table 3 (again with 1 set equal to 0). For the individual long-rate regressions, the hypothesis that 3 = 1 is rejected 7.7 percent of the time, and the hypothesis that 60 = 1 is rejected 6.7 percent of the time. These empirical sizes are quite close to the 5 percent nominal size. The third entry of 5.7 percent gives the frequency of simulated samples in which 3 = 1 and 60 = 1 were both rejected in the individual long-rate regressions. This statistic provides a relevant comparison for the system SUR estimation, which tests the joint null expectations hypothesis that 3 = 60 = 1. This joint test has an empirical size of 7.7 percent. The second and third rows of Table A1 show that the F-test is only slightly less well-sized when the data are simulated from the subsample A model estimates and the subsample B model estimates (which may re ‡ect the smaller samples in these cases).
The lower panel of Table A1 displays the frequency of rejections when the data are simulated from the exact estimated models given in Table 3 . In each of these models, In the top panel, the full-sample model estimates are used exclusively, so the data are generated under a single regime. The frequency of rejection is 5.1 percent for the 3-month regression, 3.8 percent for 60-month regression, and 2.7 percent for the system SUR, suggesting that the test is fairly well-sized though with some tendency to reject the null hypothesis less frequently than theory would predict.
The bottom panel of Table A2 provides results when the data-generating process contains a Note: These are estimated slope coe¢ cients from the system regression in equation (4) with asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. The …nal row gives p-values for the null of no change in the three slope coe¢ cients across subsamples A and B. Note: These are ML estimates from three data sample periods of the no-arbitrage model with asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. The …nal row gives the value of the maximized log-likelihood function (log L). Note: Each model is identi…ed by a parameter triple, where A , A , A , B , B , and B represent the estimates of , , and 1 in subsamples A and B, respectively. The di¤erences in the population estimates of 120 (the long-rate regression coe¢ -cient using a 120-month maturity yield) for each pair of models are reported in the middle column. The contribution to the total e¤ect on 120 is calculated as the ratio (in percent) of the e¤ect on 120 for any particular pair of models to the total e¤ect given in the …rst row. Note: The di¤erences in the population estimates of 120 (the long-rate regression coe¢ cient using a 120-month maturity yield) for each pair of models are reported in the middle column. The contribution to the total e¤ect on 120 is calculated as the ratio (in percent) of the e¤ect on 120 for any particular pair of models to the total e¤ect. Table 6 Parameter Estimates of the Macro-Finance Model Factor dynamics coe¢ cients Note: Based on asymptotic 5 percent critical values, these numbers are the frequency of rejection over 1000 simulated data samples of the hypothesis that the slope coe¢ cient is unity. The bottom panel uses the ML model estimates from Table 3 in the data-generating process (DGP), while the top panel sets 1 = 0 in each model, so the expectations hypothesis null is true. The data samples simulated from the full-sample model, the subsample A model, and the subsample B model have 396, 216, and 180 observations, respectively. Note: Based on asymptotic 5 percent critical values, these numbers are the frequency of rejection over 1000 simulated data samples of the hypothesis that the slope coe¢ cient does not shift. Each data sample in the top panel has 396 observations from the full-sample ML model in Table 3 . In the bottom panel, each data sample has 216 observations from the subsample A model and then 180 observations from the subsample B model.
